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141 
SEXUAL MISCONDUCT BY LAW ENFORCEMENT: A NEW 
MEANING TO STOP AND FRISK? 
 




“In the criminal justice system, sexually based offenses are 
considered especially heinous.  In New York City, the dedicated 
detectives who investigate these vicious felonies are members of an 
elite squad known as the Special Victims Unit.  These are their 
stories.”1 
 
Turn on the television at any time during the day and you are 
likely to find at least one channel playing an episode of Law and 
Order, Special Victims Unit (S.V.U.).  If you catch the opening 
sequence, after a few moments of catchy music, an ominous 
narrator recites the above words.  The fictional show is about a 
group of New York City detectives who investigate sex crimes and 
the attorneys who prosecute the offenders.2  The show portrays sex 
crimes as egregious offenses committed by heinous criminals.  
However, what the show fails to depict is what happens when 
these dedicated detectives commit these heinous crimes and other 
forms of sexual misconduct.  This note will explore the stories of 
these victims and the lack of federal legal remedies against the 
offending officers. 
While there are overwhelming statistics about sexual assaults 
on college campuses,3 instances of sexual assaults and rape by 
 
1 Law and Order: Special Victims Unit, IMDB, 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0203259/?ref_=ttqt_qt_tt (last visited Mar. 18, 2018). 
2 See id. 
3 See Campus Sexual Violence: Statistics, RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST NAT’L NETWORK, 
https://www.rainn.org/statistics/campus-sexual-violence (last visited Aug. 28, 2019) 
(“Sexual violence on campus is pervasive. 11.2% of all students [graduate and 
undergraduate] experience rape or sexual assault through physical force, violence or 
incapacitation . . . . [A]mong undergraduate students, 23.1% of females and 5.4% of males 
experience rape or sexual assault through physical force, violence, or incapacitation.” 
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high profile celebrities,4 and the “#MeToo” movement illuminating 
workplace sexual harassment via social media platforms,5 sexual 
misconduct by law enforcement actively remains concealed and 
stay largely outside the attention of media coverage.6  
Consequently, sexual misconduct by law enforcement officers is 
both underreported and understudied.7  The few existing studies 
there are only focus on sex crimes that lead to departmental action 
and criminal charges against the officer and neglect to address 
other forms of sexual misconduct.8 
Sexual misconduct by law enforcement includes a wide range of 
behaviors.  Not all of which are considered illegal under the federal 
statutes discussed throughout this paper.  Sexual misconduct 
includes behavior such as:  
 
 
4 See Beyond Harvey Weinstein: 33 other high-profile men accused of sexual misdeeds 
or related behavior, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2017, 2:20 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/la-et-accused-20171017-htmlstory.html (listing, 
among others, the following celebrities charged with allegations of sexual misdeeds: 
Harvey Weinstein, Bill Cosby, Bill O’Reilly, Donald Trump, Casey Affleck, Steven Seagal, 
and Anthony Weiner). 
5 See Sarah McCammon, In the Wake of #MeToo, More Victims Seek Help for Repressed 
Trauma, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec.  27, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/12/27/573146877/in-
the-wake-of-metoo-more-victims-seek-help-for-repressed-trauma; Bonnie Marcus, What 
Women Can Do To Successfully Navigate the Workplace Post #MeToo, FORBES (Jun. 13, 
2019, 1:45 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bonniemarcus/2019/06/13/what-women-can-
do-to-successfully-navigate-the-workplace-post-metoo/#5d3a963c4e95. 
6 See Matt Sedensky, AP: Hundreds of officers lose licenses over sex misconduct, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 1, 2015), 
https://apnews.com/fd1d4d05e561462a85abe50e7eaed4ec/ap-hundreds-officers-lose-
licenses-over-sex-misconduct [hereinafter Hundreds] (“In interviews, lawyers and even 
police chiefs told the AP that some departments also stay quiet about improprieties to 
limit liability, allowing bad officers to quietly resign, keep their certification and 
sometimes jump to other jobs.”). 
7  See Paula Mejia, Why Cops Get Away With Rape, NEWSWEEK (July 9, 2014, 6:12 PM), 
http://www.newsweek.com/police-sexual-assault-rape-justice-258130; see also Hundreds, 
supra note 6. 
8 See Philip M. Stinson et al., Police Sexual Misconduct: A National Scale Study of 
Arrested Officers, BOWLING GREEN ST. U., CRIM. JUST. FAC. PUBLICATIONS, 1, 6 (2014) 
[hereinafter Stinson]. Stinson states:  
[T]he line of studies had focused initially on nonviolent consensual acts and then shifted to 
include cases that clearly involved sexual harassment and coercion.  Data on cases that 
involve the most egregious forms of sex-related misconduct including rape and violent 
sexual assaults has been lacking—despite the fact that scholars often use the term “police 
sexual violence” as a label for many forms of sex-related misconduct; See also Hundreds, 
supra note 6 (“The Associated Press uncovered about 1,000 officers who lost their badges in 
a six-year period for rape, sodomy and other sexual assault; sex crimes that included 
possession of child pornography; or sexual misconduct such as propositioning citizens or 
having consensual but prohibited on-duty intercourse.”). 
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1. Sexual contact by force (e.g., sexual assault, 
rape);  
2. Sexual shakedowns (e.g., extorting sexual favors 
in exchange for not ticketing or arresting a 
citizen);  
3. Gratuitous physical contact with suspects (e.g., 
inappropriate or unnecessary searches, frisks, or 
pat-downs); 
4. Officer-initiated sexual contacts while on duty;  
5. Sexual harassment of colleagues/ co-workers; 
6. Engaging in citizen-initiated sexual contact 
while on duty;  
7. Sexual behavior while on duty (e.g., 
masturbation, viewing and/or distributing 
pornographic images, sexting); 
8. Voyeuristic actions that are sexually motivated 
(e.g., looking in windows of residences for 
sexually motivated reasons); 
9. Unnecessary contacts/actions taken by officers 
for personally and/or sexually motivated reasons 
(e.g., unwarranted call backs to crime victims, 
making a traffic stop to get closer look at the 
driver for non-professional reasons); and   
10. Inappropriate and unauthorized use of 
department resources and/or information 
systems for other than legitimate law 
enforcement purposes.9  
 
Title 18 of the United States Code § 2241 only criminalizes some 
of these behaviors under the crime of aggravated sexual abuse.10  
The definition of this crime is to knowingly cause another person 
to engage in a sexual act,11 “by using force against that person or 
 
9 See INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, ADDRESSING SEXUAL OFFENSES AND 
MISCONDUCT BY LAW ENFORCEMENT: EXECUTIVE GUIDE 3-4 (2011) [hereinafter IACP]. 
10 See 18 U.S.C. § 2241 (2007). 
11 Id. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2) (1998), a “sexual act” is defined as: 
(A) contact between the penis and the vulva or the penis and the anus . . . contact involving 
the penis occurs upon penetration, however slight;  
(B) contact between the mouth and the penis, the mouth and the vulva, or the mouth and 
the anus;  
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by threatening or placing that other person in fear that any person 
would be subjected to death, serious bodily injury12 or 
kidnapping.”13  Notably, the statute covers only the first two 
behaviors on the list above: 1. sexual contact by force (sexual 
assault and rape) and 2. sexual shakedowns (extorting sexual 
favors in exchange for not ticketing or arresting a citizen).14  
Consequently, officers engaging in behaviors listed numbered 3-10 
above, such as voyeuristic activities or misusing departmental 
resources, are not subject to any federal criminal penalties since 
there is no sexual act.15  Throughout this paper, “sexual 
misconduct” is used to refer to the broader context of behaviors as 
described in the list above and “sex crimes” or “crimes” refer to 
these federal crimes as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2241. 
Victims of sexual misconduct can be left feeling afraid, helpless 
and skeptical of the outcomes of reporting.16  While states have 
the ability to prosecute officers for committing sexual misconduct, 
relying solely on state prosecution of law enforcement raises a 
number of concerns.  First, state prosecutors work with local law 
enforcement regularly in order to prosecute other crimes.17  As 
such, prosecutors form professional, and sometimes personal, 
relationships with local law enforcement.18  Thus, “[a] district 
 
(C) the penetration, however slight, of the anal or genital opening of another by a hand or 
finger or by any object, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or 
gratify the sexual desire of any person; or  
(D) the intentional touching, not through the clothing, of the genitalia of 
another person who has not attained the age of 16 years with an intent to abuse, 
humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2246 (1998). 
12 18 U.S.C. § 2241. 18 U.S.C. § 2246(4) defining “serious bodily injury” as “involv[ing] 
a substantial risk of death, unconsciousness, extreme physical pain, protracted and obvious 
disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, 
or mental faculty.” 18 U.S.C. § 2246 (tense alternation added).  
13 18 U.S.C. § 2241. 
14 Id. 
15 Id.  
16 See Timothy M. Maher, Sexual Misconduct: Officer’s Perceptions of its Extent and 
Causality, 28 CRIM. JUST. REV. 355, 358-59 (2003). 
17 See Paul Cassell, Who prosecutes the police? Perceptions of bias in police misconduct 




18  See generally Kate Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute the Police, 101 IOWA L. REV. 
1447, 1469-1470 (2016) (stating “[t]o foster such professional reliance, prosecutors must 
have a smooth working relationship with the police. This relationship naturally carries over 
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attorney’s office that is one day calling a police officer to the stand 
as a critical witness may have a difficult time the next day 
investigating that same officer and charging him with a crime.”19  
Sex crimes must be prosecuted without the inherent bias that 
results from regularly working with the defendant-officer[s].  
Additionally, in order to achieve change within the system, federal 
oversight of local law enforcement has long been regarded as 
necessary.20  Accordingly, a combination strategy of pursuing 
federal prosecution for crimes that already fall within federal 
jurisdiction is a simple solution to addressing the issue of 
prosecutorial bias.21 
This Note seeks to explore sexual misconduct by law 
enforcement officers and the federal legal options available 
against both the individual officer and the department in which 
the officer works.  This note will argue that due to flaws in the 
current criminal and civil proceedings that a victim can bring, 
victims of sexual misconduct by law enforcement are left with 
inadequate federal legal options.  As discussed below, these legal 
options need to be reformed. 
Part I of this Note will: (A) discuss the lack of media attention 
on law enforcement misconduct; (B) explain reasons for the lack of 
data on sexual misconduct; (C) dismantle the “bad apple theory” 
and; (D) argue that sexual misconduct by law enforcement is vast 
and a systemic problem in departments across the nation.  Part II 
will discuss the federal legal options available to a victim of sexual 
misconduct by law enforcement.  These options include (A) 
prosecuting the officer under federal law 18 U.S.C. § 242; (B) 
bringing a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil action against the officer acting 
in his individual capacity; and (C) bringing a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
action against the municipality in which the officer works.  This 
 
outside of work.” Moreover, “[m]aintaining a good relationship with individual officers and 
the good will of a police department is essential to a prosecutor’s success in obtaining 
convictions, and thus to her professional life.”) 
19  Cassell, supra note 17. 
20 See generally Editorial Board, Local Police Need Federal Oversight. Exhibit A: 
Chicago, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2017) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/21/opinion/sunday/local-police-need-federal-oversight-
exhibit-a-chicago.html; Susan Heavey & Sarah N. Lynch, Before he is ousted, Sessions 
limits U.S. oversight of local police, REUTERS (Nov. 9, 2018, 8:57 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-police/before-he-is-ousted-sessions-limits-u-s-
oversight-of-local-police-idUSKCN1NE1NL. 
21 See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1996). 
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paper will argue that none of these options, as currently 
formulated, provide adequate recourse to a victim of sexual 
misconduct by law enforcement.   
To address the legal shortcoming addressed in Part II, Part III 
will make four proposals.  First, Assistant United States Attorneys 
must actively prosecute under § 242.  Second, H.R. Bill 6568 must 
be revived and enacted by Congress to close the law enforcement 
consent loophole in federal law.  Third, courts must adopt a lower 
standard of municipal liability.  Specifically, deliberate 
indifference must be changed to the lower standard of pattern and 
practice as defined by the Department of Justice.22  Finally, there 
should be a rebuttable evidentiary presumption of municipal 
liability once pattern and practice is established. 
 
I. SEXUAL MISCONDUCT BY LAW ENFORCEMENT IS A SYSTEMIC 
PROBLEM THAT IS UNDERREPORTED AND UNDERSTUDIED 
 
 A. Media Attention on Law Enforcement Misconduct 
 
Michael Brown, Eric Garner, and Tamir Rice are only a handful 
of the names that echo in chants calling for police conduct reform 
in the United States.23  The Black Lives Matter movement began 
in 2013 as a call to action against anti-black policing, politicians 
and legislation.24  Among other things, Black Lives Matter seeks 
justice for victims of excessive force by police officers.  Protests 
throughout the country have brought media attention to the 
innocent people that died as a result of anti-black policing 
practices across the country.  While Black Lives Matter brought 
media attention to physical violence at the hands of police, 
movements attempting to bring light to sexual violence by police 
have not been as successful. 
The “#SayHerName” movement centers around race and 
gender-specific violence such as sexual assault and battery by law 
 
22 See infra Part III: Proposals. 
23 See Cara E. Trombadore, Police Officer Sexual Misconduct: An Urgent Call to Action 
in a Context Disproportionately Threatening Women of Color, 32 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC 
JUST. 153, 156 (2016). 
24 See SHANELLE MATTHEWS & MISKI NOOR, BLACK LIVES MATTER 4 YEAR REPORT 2 
(Black Lives Matter, 2017), 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5964e6c3db29d6fe8490b34e/t/59678445d482e97ec9c
94ed5/1499956322766/BLM-4yrs-report.pdf. 
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enforcement officers.25  The movement seeks to call attention to 
the sexual misconduct by law enforcement officers, but has not hit 
the media with the same force as Black Lives Matter.26  By and 
large, sexual misconduct lurks in the shadows of the media 
attention surrounding anti-black policing, except in the most 
shocking cases.27  It is necessary that all cases of sexual 
misconduct receive the same attention as other forms of law 
enforcement misconduct to raise awareness of the extent of this 
issue. 
Recently, former Oklahoma City Police Officer, Daniel 
Holtzclaw, was convicted of eighteen felony charges and sentenced 
to 263 years in prison for rape, sexual battery, indecent exposure, 
and forcible oral sodomy of thirteen women who were in custody 
or inside his police car.28  Holtzclaw’s victims were all African-
American women that he targeted while patrolling low-income 
neighborhoods.29  While the racial dimension of Holtzclaw’s 
behavior is not an isolated incident,30 the Holtzclaw case is one of 








25 See KIMBERLÉ WILLIAMS CRENSHAW ET AL., SAY HER NAME, RESISTING POLICE 
BRUTALITY AGAINST BLACK WOMEN, JULY 2015 UPDATE, 1-2. 
26 See generally id. at 2, 7, 28; Kanya Bennett, Say Her Name: Recognizing Police 
Brutality Against Black Women, ACLU (June 14, 2018, 4:20 PM), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/reforming-police-practices/say-her-name-
recognizing-police-brutality. 
27 See infra Part I-B- Under-reporting: Why don’t we have all the numbers? 
28 See KFOR-TV & K. Querry, Attorneys for Former Oklahoma City Officer convicted of 
sex crimes file appeal, OKLA.’S NEWS 4 (last updated Feb. 1, 2017, 4:10 PM), 
http://kfor.com/2017/02/01/attorneys-for-former-oklahoma-city-officer-convicted-of-sex-
crimes-files-appeal/. 
29 See Sarah Larimer, Disgraced ex-cop Daniel Holtzclaw sentenced to 263 years for 
on-duty rapes, sexual assaults, WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/01/21/disgraced-ex-officer-
daniel-holtzclaw-to-be-sentenced-after-sex-crimes-conviction/?utm_term=.e0d3de009911; 
see also infra for additional discussion pertaining to the racial dimensions of sexual 
misconduct by police. 
30 See generally Jasmine Sankofa, Mapping the Blank: Centering Black Women’s 
Vulnerability to Police Sexual Violence to Upend Mainstream Police Reform, 59 HOW. L. J. 
651, 652, 653-56 (2016). 
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 B. Under-reporting—Why Don’t We Have All the Numbers? 
 
While present media attention focuses on the need for better 
data collection on the use of deadly and excessive force,31 sexual 
misconduct against arrestees remains largely unreported and 
uninvestigated.32  The “Say Her Name” movement attributes this 
to a culture where there is an “uneven power dynamic between an 
officer and his victim” and that officers know they are unlikely to 
face penalties.33  Victims of sexual misconduct by law enforcement 
officers often have vulnerable characteristics that make them 
unlikely to report the offending officer in the first place.34  These 
victims include addicts, those with criminal records, victims of a 
crime, the poor, minorities, and the young.  A study conducted by 
Bowling State University found that approximately 40% of the 
approximately 219 cases of sex-related crimes committed were 
committed against minors.35  Moreover, the timing of the sexual 
misconduct is under the exclusive control of the officer; “police-
citizen interactions often occur in the late-night hours that provide 
low public visibility and ample opportunities to those officers who 
. . . take advantage of citizens.”36  In taking advantage of the 
vulnerability of unsuspecting victims, sexual misconduct can lead 
to a victim feeling ashamed and unwilling to report the 
misconduct. 
Race is another factor that contributes to a victim’s 
vulnerability.  In fact, there is a “great deal of history to point out 
that this is not a recent phenomenon. That sexual violence by 
 
31 See Aaron C. Davis & Wesley Lowery, The FBI director calls lack of data on police 
shootings ‘ridiculous,’ ‘embarrassing’, WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/fbi-director-calls-lack-of-data-on-police-
shootings-ridiculous-embarrassing/2015/10/07/c0ebaf7a-6d16-11e5-b31c-
d80d62b53e28_story.html (stating the FBI has attempted to collect information about 
people who are killed by police officers, “but reporting is voluntary and only 3 percent of 
the nation’s 18,000 police departments comply. As a result, the data is virtually useless 
. . . .” Since government-collected information is lacking, non-governmental entities such 
as The Guardian and The Washington Post “are becoming the lead source of information 
about violent encounters between police and civilians.”) 
32 See Zoë Carpenter, The Police Violence We Aren’t Talking About, NATION (Aug. 27, 
2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/police-violence-we-arent-talking-about/. 
33 See CRENSHAW, supra note 25, at 26. 
34 See Stinson, supra note 8, at 8, 30 (stating victims of police sexual misconduct may 
not report it to the authorities because “they feel humiliated or they may fear retaliation”). 
35 See id. at 6, 26. 
36 Id. at 2. 
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police and law enforcement . . . has been a constant threat 
throughout U.S. history”37 and “has consistently been part of the 
arsenal of oppression and policing and repression against 
communities of color.”38  Sexual violence against black women 
dates back to slavery, where black women were not protected 
against rape because they were not persons protected under the 
law.39  Post-Reconstruction era segregation laws and the Jim Crow 
era further exposed black women to “threats, indecent exposure, 
and gang rape” by “white employers, police officers, and 
strangers.”40  Years later, the Holtzclaw case indicates that black 
women are still exposed to the threat of sexual misconduct by law 
enforcement to the same extent that they were during the 
reconstruction and Jim Crow era. 
The victim’s emotional response to experiencing sexual 
misconduct compounds the issue of underreporting.  In particular, 
victims fear retaliation by the officer or other officers in the 
department for reporting sexual misconduct.41  Victims of rape 
and sexual assault by law enforcement often find it “hard . . . to 
come forward with allegations because they may not feel safe to do 
so.”42  A victim of Holtzclaw, for example, who was taken into 
custody for being high on angel dust and handcuffed in the 
hospital bed was coerced into “performing oral sex, suggesting her 
cooperation would lead to dropped charges.”43  She felt that “‘all 
police [would] work together’” and was scared to report the officer’s 
misconduct.44  This victim’s response is not without merit.  In fact, 
 
37 Cheryl Corley, ‘Invisible No More’ Examines Police Violence Against Minority 
Women, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 5, 2017, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2017/11/05/561931899/invisible-no-more-examines-police-violence-
against-minority-women. 
38 Id.  
39 See Sankofa, supra note 30, at 673-75. 
40 Id. at 676. 
41 See Diana Tourjée, Serial Rapist and Sniveling Cop Daniel Holtzclaw Faces 3 
Centuries Imprisonment, VICE (Dec. 11, 2015, 4:55 PM), 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/nz8p5m/serial-rapist-and-sniveling-cop-daniel-
holtzclaw-faces-3-centuries-imprisonment. 
42 Diana Tourjée, Sexual Assault by Police Officers Is Even More Common Than You 
Think, VICE (Nov. 2, 2015, 5:00 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/gvze7q/sexual-
assault-by-police-officers-is-even-more-common-than-you-think. 
43 Matt Sedensky & Nomaan Merchant, Betrayed by the Badge, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(Nov. 1, 2015), http://interactives.ap.org/2015/betrayed-by-the-badge/ [hereinafter 
Betrayed]. 
44 Id.   
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Chief Bernadette DiPino of the Sarasota Police Department in 
Florida, who studies police sexual misconduct for the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police,45 stated, “[sexual 
misconduct is] happening probably in every law enforcement 
agency across the country. . . . [I]t’s so underreported, and people 
are scared that if they call and complain about a police officer, they 
think every police officer is going to be then out to get them.”46 
Additionally, hopelessness and “skepticism about the ability [or 
willingness] of officers and prosecutors to investigate their 
colleagues”47 deters victims from reporting.  Another of 
Holtzclaw’s victims, “[t]he youngest of the accusers, who was 17 
when she says Holtzclaw raped her on her mother’s front porch, 
said the attack left her unsure about what to do.48 ‘Like, what am 
I going to do?’ she said at the pretrial hearing. ‘Call the cops? He 
was a cop.’”49  Her feeling of hopelessness is not uncommon among 
victims.  In fact, it echoes that of Holtzclaw’s victim who was high 
on angel dust.  This hopelessness leads to a feeling of skepticism 
that even if the victim does report the officer, very little will be 
done to help her.50 
Unlike instances of lethal force, where there is undeniable 
evidence of the occurrence (the dead body), the sole source of 
evidence of sexual misconduct is the victim.  Despite the failure of 
departments to keep accurate data on deadly force by officers, 
other evidence—such as death records, autopsies, news reports, 
and families seeking repercussions against the department for 
those killed by law enforcement—assist in producing prompt 
reports and provide reliable data on deadly force.51  Victims of 
sexual misconduct, on the other hand, have the choice of whether 
to report the incident.  This choice is undoubtedly influenced by 
 
45 See Hundreds, supra note 6. 
46 Betrayed, supra note 43. 
47 See Hundreds, supra note 6. 
48 Betrayed, supra note 43. 
49 Id. 
50 See generally id. 
51 See Jon Swaine et al., The Counted People killed by police in the US., About the 
Project, GUARDIAN, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-
interactive/2015/jun/01/about-the-counted (last visited Aug. 30, 2019). The Guardian 
tracked deaths by police in 2015 and 2016 by compiling verified crowdsourced data in 
using “police reports and witness statements, by monitoring regional news outlets, 
research groups and open-source reporting projects such as the websites Fatal Encounters 
and Killed by Police.” Id.  
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the emotions of fear of retaliation, shame, and hopelessness, 
discussed above.  When the source of evidence (the victim) is 
silenced, it is impossible to track the extent of this issue.52 
 
C. Not Just a Few “Bad Apples” 
 
Although still largely unreported by victims and under-
investigated by departments, sexual misconduct by law 
enforcement officers occurs more frequently than one would 
think.53  Much like excessive force, the data on sexual misconduct 
is primarily collected by news sources and universities, since 
neither local departments nor the federal government are required 
to keep track of this information.54  A study conducted by Bowling 
State University identified 548 sex related crimes committed by 
police officers between 2005-2007.55  The study used Google News 
and Google Alerts to compile information from news and media 
sources.56  These sources typically only report “newsworthy 
crimes” that have shock value to the reader.57  Of these 548 sex 
related crimes, 118 instances involved forcible or statutory rape, 
“93 cases of forcible sodomy, 43 aggravated and simple assaults, 
and 11 cases that involved a sexual assault with an object.”58  
Notably, this study only provides insight on sex crimes and does 
not account for other forms of sexual misconduct that are not 
exposed in the media.  Thus, this study only gives us a part of the 
picture of sexual misconduct. 
A study conducted by the Associated Press in 2015 uncovered 
that about 1,000 officers “lost their badges59 in a six-year period 
for rape, sodomy, and other sexual assault like sex crimes that 
 
52 See Stinson, supra note 8, at 3. 
53 See Tourjée, supra note 41. 
54 See Swaine, supra note 51; Stinson, supra note 8, at 3. 
55 See Stinson supra note 8, at 14. 
56 See id. at 4. 
57 See id. at 25-26 (describing the potentially skewed results of the study toward only 
uncovering more violent instances of sexual misconduct which were predominantly 
“newsworthy” acts of sexual violence, particularly those involving minors). 
58 Id. at 25. 
59 See Hundreds, supra note 6; Rachel A. Harmon, Legal Remedies for Police 
Misconduct 43 (Va. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Res. Paper, Paper No. 40, 2017) (describing that 
officers have licenses or certifications by the state in which they work, “the commissions 
that provide for the training and certification of officers, or other state boards, also have 
the power to deprive an officer” of his or her power over civilians). 
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included possession of child pornography or sexual misconduct 
such as propositioning citizens or having consensual but 
prohibited on-duty intercourse.”60  This number translates to a 
police officer losing their badge approximately every two to three 
days as a result of engaging in sexual misconduct between 2009 
and 2014.  As shocking as these numbers are, they are still likely 
a gross undercount.61  Although this study provides a fuller picture 
than the Bowling State study, the Associated Press study does not 
account for officers who did not lose their badges, but nevertheless 
had claims of sexual misconduct asserted against them.  Such 
claims are made against the officer, but may go uninvestigated or 
may not result in a penalty.62  Additionally, this number does not 
account for states, such as California or New York, which do not 
have a “statewide system to decertify officers for misconduct.”63  
Decertification systems prevent terminated officers from being 
hired in other jurisdictions within the state.64  Therefore, officers 
who lose their badges in a state without a decertification system 
can be hired as officers in other jurisdictions and continue to 
work.65  This also means that officers who lose their badges in 
states without a decertification system are not counted in this 
study, as there is no way to track who lost their badge for engaging 
in sexual misconduct in those states.66 
 
60 Hundreds, supra note 6. 
61 See id. 
62 See generally id. 
63 Id. 
64 See Betrayed, supra note 43; see also Roger L. Goldman, Police Officer Decertification: 
Promoting Police Professionalism through State Licensing and the National Decertification 
Index, MASS POLICE REFORM (Aug. 20, 2015), http://masspolicereform.org/2015/08/police-
officer-decertification-promoting-police-professionalism-through-state-licensing-and-the-
national-decertification-index/. 
65 See Goldman, supra note 64.  Forty-four out of fifty states have decertification 
programs that entail a process for removal of a police officer who has engaged in serious 
misconduct:  
[T]hereby preventing the officer from serving with any law enforcement agency in that 
state. . . . [I]n the absence of such a law, there is nothing to stop a department from hiring 
an obviously unfit police officer. . . . [W]hy would an officer known to be unfit be hired by 
another department . . . ? [A] chief of a financially strapped department has the choice of 
hiring a certified but questionable officer or hiring a brand new recruit, whose academy 
training may have to be paid for out of the department’s budget. Thus, there is a financial 
incentive to ignore police misconduct. . . . [A] cash-poor department is able to hire [unfit 
officers] at a discount. Finally, the officer is immediately ready for duty, while the new 
recruit has to spend up to six months at the police academy. Id.  
66 See Betrayed, supra note 43. In fact, “[a]necdotal evidence suggests that in the 
absence of decertification, officers who have been disciplined or fired for violating individual 
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D. The Systemic Culture of Sexual Misconduct by Law 
Enforcement 
 
The sentiment that these heinous crimes are only committed by 
a few rogue officers (or bad apples) is false and overlooks the larger 
context of law enforcement culture that allows and breeds this 
type of behavior among officers.67  One example that shows how 
this behavior extends beyond an individual offending officer is the 
Oakland, California Police Department.  In 2016, the department 
conducted an investigation into the sexual misconduct of Officer 
Brendan O’Brien, who committed suicide.68  Tipped off by his 
suicide note, which included information about sexual misconduct 
committed against a teenage sex worker, a court-ordered 
investigation revealed that at least fourteen officers from Oakland 
and eight members of other law enforcement agencies were 
involved in a sexual relationship with the teenage sex worker that 
“would be considered statutory rape and human trafficking.”69  
Four other officers were terminated by the city administrator for 
other instances of sexual misconduct, including “attempted sexual 
assault, engaging in lewd conduct in public, assisting the crime of 
prostitution, assisting in evading arrest for the crime of 
prostitution,” and seven more were suspended for “failing to report 
other officers who had sexual conduct with a minor.”70  In response 
to the scandal, the Mayor of Oakland, Libby Schaaf stated, “[w]e 
need to root out what is clearly a toxic, macho culture,” and that 
she is running “a police department, not a frat house.”71  
Issues such as hyper-masculinity, gender stereotypes, and the 
blue wall of silence all contribute to the systemic culture of 
misconduct by officers.  These issues have come to light in the 
 
rights frequently find employment in smaller departments with poor candidate screening 
or more limited resources for hiring highly-qualified officers.” See Harmon, supra note 59, 
at 44. 
67 See Tourjée, supra note 41. 
68 See Sam Levin, Four Oakland police officers fired, seven suspended, in sexual 




71 Sam Levin, Oakland loses third police chief in a week amid scandals, GUARDIAN 
(June 18, 2016, 12:22 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jun/18/third-
oakland-police-chief-quits-within-a-week-amid-scandals. 
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context of excessive force but have parallels when analyzing sexual 
misconduct.  For example, in the context of excessive force, 
“policing has often been traced to racial bias, but it may stem in 
equal part from gender. . . .  [H]idden police officer machismo is 
exacerbating the more commonly noticed problem of racial 
profiling.”72  Indeed, studies document how gender stereotypes 
and masculinity lead to more aggressive behavior in departments 
where former members of the military are given hiring preferences 
and where officers bully suspects.73 
Contrastingly, in precincts where there are more women, there 
are fewer excessive force claims since women are more likely to 
use de-escalation techniques by acting as a mediator rather than 
drawing their weapons.74  Female officers also decrease the 
amount that a department has to spend in defending claims of 
excessive force.75  Specifically, greater female representation 
within departments may also decrease the instances of sexual 
misconduct committed by officers.76  Sexual misconduct by officers 
is tied to masculinity and power: “[W]hen police officers get macho, 
women of color may also become victims of their violence. Police 
bullying of women can come in the forms of false charges, physical 
violence or sexual assaults.”77 
The blue wall of silence further exacerbates the issue of sexual 
misconduct by officers.  The wall of silence is an unwritten code 
among officers not to report or investigate the errors or misconduct 
of other officers as a symbol of loyalty.78  Take the Oakland Police 
 
72 Frank Rudy Cooper, America’s police have a masculinity problem, BUS. INSIDER (July 
19, 2016, 10:21 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/americas-police-have-a-masculinity-
problem-2016-7. 
73 See id. 
74 See Kelly Wallace, Could more female police lead to safer communities? CNN,  
http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/24/health/women-law-enforcement-recruitment/index.html 
(last updated Apr.  24, 2017, 6:28 AM) (“The average male officer is 8½ times more likely 
to have an excessive force complaint against him than a woman . . . .”). 
75 See id. (“When it comes to excessive force liability lawsuits, the average male officer 
costs between 2½ and 5½ times more than the average female police officer. The average 
male officer is two to three times more likely to have been named in a citizen’s excessive 
force complaint.”). 
76 See generally id. 
77 Cooper, supra note 72. 
78 See Selwyn Raab, THE UNWRITTEN CODE THAT STOPS POLICE FROM 
SPEAKING, N.Y. TIMES, (June 16, 
1985) https://www.nytimes.com/1985/06/16/weekinreview/the-unwritten-code-that-stops-
police-from-speaking.html. 
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Department, for example.  According to the Court-Appointed 
Investigator’s Report on the City of Oakland’s Response to 
Allegations of Officer Sexual Misconduct, the investigation of 
Officer O’Brien’s suicide “went off track as soon as it started.”79  
The Criminal Investigation Division of the Oakland Police 
Department closed the investigation of O’Brien’s death within a 
week of opening it, despite “evidence suggesting other officers had 
inappropriate contact with [the teenager].”80  The Criminal 
Investigation Division further did “not inform the [District 
Attorney’s] Office of the allegations [thus] shield[ing] its 
inadequate investigation from external review.”81  Moreover, 
when the department’s Internal Affairs Division conducted an 
administrative investigation, investigators failed to “ask follow-up 
questions that could have led to additional information.”82  When 
interviewing the teenage victim, the investigator’s “tone 
alternated between frustrated, angry, and patronizing” but when 
interviewing the officers implicated by O’Brien’s suicide note, the 
investigator was “friendly and non-confrontational.”83  The 
subsequent report that summarized the interviews described the 
officers as witnesses rather than subjects of the investigation, 
minimizing the role that these officers had in the misconduct.84  
The Court-Appointed Investigator’s Report concluded that the 
department inadequately investigated Officer O’Brien’s death and 
other officers in their role in sex scandal.85 
As shown by the investigation conducted by the Oakland Police 
Department, the blue wall of silence leads to cover-ups and 
cultivates a “culture of American policing [that] does nothing to 
encourage the good apples from policing the bad ones. In fact, it 
 
79 EDWARD SWANSON ET AL., COURT-APPOINTED INVESTIGATOR’S REPORT ON THE CITY 
OF OAKLAND’S RESPONSE TO ALLEGATIONS OF OFFICER SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 24 (June 21, 
2017) https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-CA-0010-0025.pdf. 
80 Id. at 10. 
81 Id. at 26. 
82 Id. at 16. 
83 Id. at 16, 18. 
84 See id. at 19. 
85 See id. at 24-28. 
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does the opposite and thus leaves all of us . . . vulnerable to any 
bad apples with violent tendencies, badges, and firearms.”86  
When “cops don’t tell on cops,”87 “the code of silence all but 
assures impunity for officers who commit human rights 
violations.”88  The very nature of sexual misconduct makes this 
systemic nature even more troubling.  When sexual misconduct is 
inadequately investigated by the department, as it was in 
Oakland, victims of sexual misconduct are left to trust a system 




Sexual misconduct by officers is understudied and the lack of 
data caused by underreporting is exacerbated by issues of race 
relations and the blue wall of silence.  Even if victims overcome 
their own vulnerabilities and come forward to report sexual 
misconduct to the authorities, victims ultimately have limited 
avenues of legal recourse.  This Note focuses exclusively on the 
current federal options for victims.89  Under federal law, a victim 
can file: (1) a complaint of an 18 U.S.C § 242 federal crime; (2) a 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil lawsuit against the offending officer 
individually; and/or (3) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil lawsuit against the 
department in which the offending officer works.90  As explained 
below, these current options offer inadequate assistance to victims 
of sexual misconduct.  Consequently, the federal law needs to be 
reworked in order to have meaningful options that will provide 
redress to individual victims and will decrease sexual misconduct 
by officers.   
 
86 Keli Goff, Racist Cops, Abused Women and the Blue Wall of Silence, DAILY BEAST,  
https://www.thedailybeast.com/racist-cops-abused-women-and-the-blue-wall-of-silence 
(last updated Apr. 13, 2017, 3:26 PM). 
87 COMM’N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-
CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP’T, COMMISSION REPORT 53 (1994). 
88 Code of Silence, HUM. RTS. WATCH, 
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/police/uspo27.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2019). 
89 While there are certainly state options as well, this Note limits its scope to federal 
options. It is my position that focusing on federal legal options will remove the issue of 
prosecutorial bias of state prosecutors against an officer with which they may work daily. 
As discussed in Part III-A, centralizing reporting of misconduct claims to agents of the 
federal government will not only remove the bias that a state prosecutor may have but will 
also provide data as to the extent of the issue. 
90 See Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 453, 464-465 (2004). 
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A. File Criminal Charges against the Officer 
 
This section will argue that as currently formulated, federal law 
fails to provide adequate criminal sanctions against officers who 
commit sexual misconduct.  First, as discussed in Part (1) of this 
section, while 18 U.S.C. § 242 criminalizes sexual misconduct by 
an individual acting under color of law, charges are rarely brought 
under the statute.91  Second, as discussed in Part (2) of this 
section, federal law is lagging behind state law in failing to enact 
H.R. Bill 6568, “Closing the Law Enforcement Consent Loophole 
Act of 2018” which provides that an individual in the custody of 
law enforcement is incapable of consenting to sex.92  As discussed 
in Part III: Proposals, below, charges under § 242 must be actively 
brought by prosecutors and the “Closing the Law Enforcement 
Consent Loophole Act of 2018” must be enacted by Congress in 
order to ensure that perpetrators of sexual misconduct by law 
enforcement do not escape charges due to a hole in federal law. 
 
 1. File Criminal Charges against the Officer under 18 U.S.C. § 
242 in Federal Court 
 
18 U.S.C. § 242, in relevant part, provides:  
 
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, 
regulation, or custom willfully subjects any person 
. . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured or protected by the Constitution 
or laws of the United States . . . if such acts include 
kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated 
sexual abuse, or an attempt to commit aggravated 
sexual abuse . . . shall be fined under this title, or 
imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, 
or may be sentenced to death.93 
 
 
91 See Paul J. Watford, Screws v. United States and the Birth of Federal Civil Rights 
Enforcement, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 465, 483 (2014). 
92 See Closing the Law Enforcement Consent Loophole Act of 2018, H.R. 6568, 115th 
Cong. (2ND SESS. 2018).   
93 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1996). 
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This section allows for the federal prosecution of torts and 
crimes that are otherwise usually subject to state jurisdiction.  
Section 2241 of the Code defines aggravated sexual abuse as 
“knowingly caus[ing] another person to engage in a sexual act—
(1) by using force against that other person; or (2) by threatening 
or placing another person in fear that any person will be subjected 
to death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping.”94  In the context of 
sexual misconduct, the constitutional violation lies in an 
individual’s Fourth Amendment right to bodily integrity and 
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.95  The sentencing 
options for § 242 feature a maximum of life imprisonment or death, 
and thus indicate the seriousness of this federal crime.96 
Section 242 is a Reconstruction-era statute enacted as a part of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866.  The act was intended to protect the 
civil rights of freed slaves after the Civil War.97 Congress “sought 
to secure equal rights in everyday” life as a result of a significant 
amount of racially motivated violence after the Civil War.98  
However, due to a series of decisions that struck down portions of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866,99 there was a “dormancy in federal 
civil rights enforcement.”100  This dormancy led to unregulated 
violence at the hands of both law enforcement and private citizens 
against blacks in the south.101  It was not until 1939 when the 
Attorney General at the time, Frank Murphy, created the Civil 
Rights Section of the Department of Justice that hope of reviving 
federal civil rights enforcement grew.102 
The new Civil Rights Section was looking for statutes under 
which they could prosecute civil rights violations.103  Two statutes, 
the Anti-Peonage Act of 1867 and what is now 18 U.S.C. § 241, 
were too limited to be applied to civil rights violations generally.104  
 
94 18 U.S.C. § 2241 (2007) (alternation to original).  
95 See Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 878-79, 881 (9th Cir. 2001). 
96 See 18 U.S.C. § 242. 
97 See Watford, supra note 91, at 471. 
98 Id. 
99 See generally id. at 472, 474. 
100 Id. at 474. 
101 See id. 
102 See id. 
103 See id. at 475. 
104 See id. at 475-476 (stating: 
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The third, now 18 U.S.C.  § 242, “had been the subject of only two 
reported [trial court] decisions.”105  The Screws case, discussed 
below, was a test case for the Civil Rights Section to take to the 
Supreme Court to define “willfully” and “operating under color of 
law” under § 242.106 
In Screws v. United States, the police placed Robert Hall under 
arrest for theft of a tire.107 Hall was brought to the courthouse, 
where the three arresting officers beat him with their fists, a solid-
bar, and a two-pound blackjack, rendering him unconscious.108  
Hall was then thrown in jail and died shortly thereafter.109  The 
Supreme Court analyzed a predecessor statute of § 242 to address 
the issue of the “non-enumerated constitutional right to be free 
from police brutality.”110 
In § 242 prosecutions, prosecutors are required to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that (1) that there was a constitutional 
violation and (2) that the officer violated the constitution 
willfully.111  In the Court’s analysis of the terms of § 242, Justice 
Douglas first addressed and defined “willfully” as having the 
specific intent to deprive the victim of their constitutional 
rights.112  Notably, “[t]he fact that the defendants may not have 
been thinking in constitutional terms is not material where their 
aim was not to enforce local law but to deprive a citizen of a right 
and that right was protected by the Constitution.”113  Moreover, 
the court requires proof the act was “intentional rather than 
accidental”114 or that there was “[a]n evil motive to accomplish 
that which the statute condemns becomes a constituent element of 
 
the Anti-Peonage Act of 1867, is of relatively limited use, since it’s confined to cases 
involving peonage, aform of involuntary servitude. . . . 18 U.S.C.  § 241 . . . prohibits two or 
more persons from conspiring to prevent someone from exercising his or her federal 
constitutional rights . . . [but is] limited to interference with rights arising from the 
relationship between the victim and the federal government [not the state]. 
105 Id. at 476 (alteration to original). 
106 Id. at 476-77. 
107 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 92 (1945). 
108 Id. at 92-93. 
109 Id. at 93. 
110 See Frederick M. Lawrence, Civil Rights and Criminal Wrongs: The Mens Rea of 
Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2113, 2179-81 (1993). 
111 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1996) (this statue protects against violations of the constitution or 
laws of the United States). 
112 Screws, 325 U.S. at 107. 
113 Id. at 106. 
114 Id. at 101. 
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the crime.”115  Importantly, the willful purpose “need not be 
expressed; it may be inferred from all the circumstances attendant 
on the act.”116  
Second, the Court defined acting “under color of law.”117 Where 
“officers of the State were performing official duties” and misuse 
the “power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only 
because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law” 
then the officer is acting under “‘color of state law.’”118 The Court 
declined to invalidate the statute for vagueness and remanded the 
case for retrial with jury instructions consistent with the defined 
terms.119   
The Court’s decision in Screws makes clear that the officer need 
not be thinking in constitutional terms at the time of the 
constitutional violation and the willful purpose may be inferred 
from the circumstances.  So long as the state actor is intentionally 
engaging in behavior with a bad purpose that violates the 
Constitution, they are acting willfully and therefore violating § 
242.  In the context of sexual misconduct, these definitional 
conclusions are particularly important.  When an officer rapes 
someone, their purpose is to commit rape, not to consciously 
violate the individual’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due 
process or their Fourth Amendment right to bodily integrity.  Yet 
the officer is engaging in behavior specifically covered by the 
statute that correlates directly to constitutional violations.  
Officers do not accidentally rape civilians.  This behavior is 
intentional in each and every case and therefore, under the Screws 
analysis, the conduct falls within the ambit of § 242. 
Critics of Screws argue that Justice Douglas’s opinion 
“attempted, unsuccessfully, to solve the vagueness problem” of the 
statute.120  They further complain that Screws’ language is facially 
inconsistent and “Screws is not a model of clarity.”121  These critics 
 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 106. 
117 See generally id. at 107-108. 
118 Id. at 109, 110. 
119 See id. at 103, 113. 
120 Lawrence, supra note 110, at 2180. 
121 United States v. Johnstone, 107 F.3d 200, 208 (3d Cir. 1997) (where a police officer 
was convicted of six counts of excessive force, the Court analyzed the Screws standard to 
determine whether the jury was properly instructed as to the intent requirement under § 
242.).  
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further argue that the Court imposed a requirement that “made it 
harder for the government to win convictions, even in cases where 
the defendants obviously acted in bad faith” and that it has never 
been clear how to prove this element.122  Under the cloud of these 
critics, prosecutors were strongly discouraged from bringing a § 
242 claim since it was ultimately not clear how to prove one.   
For years, § 242 has been rarely used.123  Even after the Screws 
decision, “[t]he federal government brought relatively few § 242 
prosecutions, and that’s still true today.”124  Research on § 242 
shows that the Screws case was the last time the Supreme Court 
analyzed § 242.  Moreover, less than “100 federal prosecutions are 
brought against law enforcement officials for constitutional 
violations each year.”125  This small number is likely attributable 
to two reasons.  First, the statute is over 150 years old and was 
enacted in response to racially motivated violence resulting from 
the end of the Civil War.126  As shown by Holtzclaw, however, 
aggravated sexual abuse is still racially motivated and the 
behavior this statute was enacted to criminalize is very much alive 
today.127  As such, prosecutors should dust off this long forgotten 
statute and deploy it as a powerful tool against aggravated sexual 
abuse by state law enforcement.   
Second, the mixed critiques of Screws regarding the difficulties 
in proving whether an officer acted willfully lead to few 
prosecutors wanting to take on the case.  Federal prosecutors must 
not bring federal charges “unless they believe that the government 
will likely prevail at trial.”128  However, when the federal 
prosecutor is unsure of the elements of proving a charge under § 
242, they are not prohibited from bringing the case in the first 
place; it just makes the case harder to prove.  It is the job of the 
 
122 Watford, supra note 91, at 482. 
123 Id. at 483.  
124 Id. 
125 Harmon, supra note 59, at 41 (these violations included § 242 violations as well as 
use of force cases.) “For decades, under two federal statutes known as Section 241 and 
Section 242, the division has conducted thorough, impartial investigations of individual 
officers for criminal violations of constitutional rights. . . . From 2009 – 2016, the division 
charged more than 580 law enforcement officials for committing willful violations of civil 
rights and related crimes.” CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION HIGHLIGHTS: 2009-2017, 32 (Jan. 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/crt/page/file/923096/download.   
126 See generally, Watford, supra note 91, at 471; Lawrence, supra note 110, at 2118.   
127 Larimer, supra note 29.  
128 Harmon, supra note 59, at 41.  
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prosecutor to demand courts further define the terms of § 242 so 
they may prosecute these cases.  They should not let such an 
important and applicable statute fall to the wayside based on the 
fact that it is confusing.  It has been over 70 years since Screws 
was last analyzed by the Supreme Court.  It is time for prosecutors 
to force the courts to clarify the terms at issue.   
Regardless of the outstanding confusion and criticisms of 
Screws, the Civil Rights Section of the Department of Justice 
should zealously pursue § 242 prosecutions against officers.  
Screws defines willfully as acting intentionally with a bad purpose 
to commit a constitutional violation.129  Under this definition, 
instances of aggravated sexual abuse by state actors are always 
committed willfully, and therefore need to be prosecuted.  These 
prosecutions are important to “build public confidence in the 
government’s commitment to lawful policing and fair application 
of criminal justice.”130  Law enforcement officers are not outside of 
the reach of criminal law, especially when they intentionally 
commit criminal acts.  The fact that the case may be difficult for 
prosecutors to prove, or that the case may be headed to the 
Supreme Court for further clarification, is not a reason to let these 
crimes go unpunished.  The federal government must actively 
pursue criminal prosecutions using this longstanding federal 
statute to punish sexual violence by officers and to bring justice to 
its victims. 
 
2. Closing the Law Enforcement Consent Loophole Act of 2018 
 
As the federal law stands, a law enforcement officer accused of 
rape or sexual assault can use consent as a defense to the charges. 
H.R. Bill 6568, entitled “Closing the Law Enforcement Consent 
Loophole Act of 2018” (hereinafter H.R. Bill 6568),131 seeks to 
amend the federal crime of sexual abuse of a minor or ward.132  
The amendment would add subsection (c) to provide: “[w]hoever, 
being a Federal law enforcement officer, knowingly engages in a 
sexual act with an individual who is under arrest, in detention, or 
 
129 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 103 (1945). 
130 Harmon, supra note 59, at 43. 
131 Closing the Law Enforcement Consent Loophole Act of 2018, H.R. 6568, 115th Cong. 
(2ND SESS. 2018).   
132 18 U.S.C. § 2243 (2007) (sexual abuse of a minor or a ward). 
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otherwise in the actual custody of that Federal law enforcement 
officer, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 15 
years, or both.”133  The amendment would also prevent law 
enforcement officials from asserting consent as a defense to 
charges of sexual assault and rape of people in custody.134  
Presently, more than half the states allow the consent defense in 
prosecutions against law enforcement for sex crimes.135  However, 
recently New York was a key state that has eliminated the consent 
defense; thus, closing the loophole and spurring federal interest in 
doing the same.136  Supporters of the H.R. Bill 6568 “argue the bill 
criminalizes an action that should clearly be criminal: raping 
somebody while in a position of legal power over them, then falsely 
claiming it was consensual.”137  Without this amendment, such 
behavior is not criminalized under the present statute.  Notably, 
there was no outright opposition to the bill, both federally and on 
the state level for similar bills.138 
Importantly, H.R. Bill 6568 also includes an incentive to states 
to encourage annual reports to Congress reporting the number of 
such complaints.139  Representative Jackie Speier, of California 
introduced the H.R. Bill 6568 in July of 2018.140  In doing so, she 
addressed that while “sexual misconduct is the second most 
frequently reported form of police abuse . . . the true scope of the 
problem is unknown because states are not required to report 
 
133 H.R. 6568. 
134 Id. (amending subsection (d) to add paragraph (3) “In a prosecution under 
subsection (c), it is not a defense that the other person consented to the sexual act.”). 
135 H.R. 6568 (115th): Closing the Law Enforcement Consent Loophole Act of 2018, 
Summary, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/hr6568/summary (last 
updated Aug. 30, 2018) [hereinafter Govtrack H.R. 6568]. 
136 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05 (McKinney 2018); see also Govtrack H.R. 6568, supra 
note 135.  
137 Govtrack H.R. 6568, supra note 135. 
138 See generally id. 
139 H.R. 6568. H.R. 6568 states:  
The Attorney General shall submit to Congress, on an annual basis, a report containing-   
(1) the information required to be reported to the Attorney General under section 3(b); and  
(2) information on the number of reports made, during the previous year, to Federal law 
enforcement agencies regarding Federal law enforcement officers engaging in a sexual act 
with an individual who is under arrest, in detention, or otherwise in the actual custody of 
the law enforcement officer. Id.  
140 Id. 
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these kinds of allegations.”141  Thus, in providing an incentive to 
states to report data both federal and state governments will be 
able to get a better picture as to the scope of this country-wide 
problem if the bill is enacted.  
Although H.R. Bill 6568 died in Congress,142 similar bills on the 
state level have gained momentum.143  Regardless, it is imperative 
that there is a law at the federal level punishing the rape of a ward 
while in a position of legal power and also a law preventing 
accused law enforcement officers from using consent as a defense 
to abusing the differential in power they have over citizens. 
 
B. File Civil Charges against the Officer 
  
1. Civil Remedies Under § 1983 
 
While criminal prosecutions are one avenue of recourse for 
victims, civil damages are another remedy that victims can seek.  
Despite the confusion surrounding § 242 in Screws, the Court’s 
decision “helped breathe life into another, more useful tool,” 42 
U.S.C. § 1983.144  This section of the United States Code provides 
a civil avenue of recourse for victims of sexual misconduct by 
officers.  Section 1983 provides:  
 
Every person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State 
or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, 
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at 
 
141 H.R. 6568 (115th): Closing the Law Enforcement Consent Loophole Act of 2018, 
Overview, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/hr6568 (last visited Oct. 
13, 2019) [hereinafter Govtrack H.R. 6568 Overview]. 
142 Id. A bill under the same name was brought to the Senate in November 2018, but 
was not passed. See Closing the Law Enforcement Consent Loophole Act of 2018, S. 3688, 
115th Cong. (2ND SESS. 2018); see also infra Part III(B) (further discussion and analysis of 
S. 3688).  
143 Govtrack H.R. 6568, supra note 135. Similar legislation passed in Maryland, New 
Hampshire, and Kansas with no opposition. Id.  
144 Watford, supra note 91, at 484. 
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law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress . . . .145  
 
A civil § 1983 lawsuit can be brought for damages against three 
possible parties: (1) the officer acting in their individual capacity, 
(2) the officer acting in his official capacity, or (3) the department 
or city.146  Central to any § 1983 claim against any of these three 
parties are state action and a constitutional violation.   
Like § 242, under any § 1983 action, the officer must be acting 
under color of law, or as an agent of the state.147  Whether an 
officer acts under color of law depends on “the nature of the 
circumstances of the officer’s conduct and the relationship of that 
conduct to the performance of his official duties.”148  If the acts of 
sexual misconduct are “made possible only because the wrong doer 
is clothed with the authority of state law”149 the action is under 
color of law, even if the officer is acting for purely personal 
purposes.   
For example, in Smith v. Carruth, color of law was established 
when the plaintiff was kidnapped and raped by the officer who 
“flashed his police badge, handcuffed her, Mirandized her, placed 
her under arrest[,] . . . [a]nd used his position and authority to 
intimidate the victim into compliance.”150  Similarly, in Rogers v. 
City of Little Rock, Morgan, a uniformed officer, followed the 
plaintiff, Rogers, in his patrol car after he stopped her for a broken 
tail light.151  The court held Morgan “abused his power while 
carrying out the official duties entrusted to him by the state . . . 
[and thus] he acted under the color of state law.”152 
The constitutional violation is based on either the Fourth 
Amendment right to bodily integrity or the Fourteenth 
 
145 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
146 See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31 (1991); Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 
U.S. 58, 71 n.10 (1989); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). 
147 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia . . . .” Id. 
(emphasis added). 
148 Rogers v. City of Little Rock, 152 F.3d 790, 798 (8th Cir. 1998).   
149 Smith v. Carruth, No. CIV.A.15-4570, 2017 WL 785345, at *8 (E.D. La. Mar. 1, 2017) 
(quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988)). 
150 Id. at *8-9. 
151 See Rogers,152 F.3d at 793, 798. 
152 Id. at 798. 
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Amendment right to due process.  If the misconduct occurs during 
arrest or investigatory stop, it is analyzed under the Fourth 
Amendment,153 whereas the Fourteenth Amendment is used when 
no arrest occurs.154  The standard to prove a violation of the 
statute is dependent on which constitutional right is being 
violated.   
The protection of the Fourth Amendment is triggered during an 
arrest and continues to protect a suspect when they are in the 
patrol vehicle on the way to booking.155  The Fourth Amendment 
protects against the unreasonable seizure of one’s bodily 
integrity.156  Although the Fourth Amendment is often examined 
in the context of the use of excessive force during arrest, the 
Fourth Amendment “prohibits more than the unnecessary strike 
of a nightstick, sting of a bullet, and thud of a boot.”157  Thus, 
courts have extended it to sexual misconduct by officers.158  
For example, in Fontana v. Haskin, Mia Fontana was arrested 
for drunk driving, handcuffed, and driven to Orange County Jail 
by Officers Haskin and Deschepper.159  On the way to the jail, 
Haskin sat in the back seat next to Fontana and “inappropriately 
touched and sexually harassed [Fontana].”160  His conduct 
included: “telling [Fontana] she had nice legs; telling [Fontana] 
that he could be her ‘older man’; putting his arm around [Fontana]; 
[and] massaging her shoulders.”161  Consequently, Fontana sued 
Haskin under § 1983 for violating her civil rights based on the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.162  The court held, 
“although a possible fit under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
[Fontana’s claim] is better seen as a Fourth Amendment claim 
 
153 See Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 878-81 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating “the Fourth 
Amendment protects a criminal defendant after arrest on the trip to the police station.”).   
154 See Rogers, 152 F.3d at 796.   
155 See Fontana, 262 F.3d at 879.  
156 See U.S. CONST. amend.  IV.  
157 Fontana, 262 F.3d at 878. 
158 See generally id. at 878-79 (stating “[b]eyond the specific proscription of excessive 
force, the Fourth Amendment generally proscribes ‘unreasonable intrusions on one’s bodily 
integrity,’ [citation omitted] and other harassing and abusive behavior that rises to the level 
of ‘unreasonable seizure.’”). 
159 See id. at 875.   
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 See id.  
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because she had been seized by the police.”163  Similarly, in 
Knickerbocker v. City of Colville, where there were numerous 
incidents of sexual misconduct against two officers, the court held 
that the Fourth Amendment applies in incidents where the officers 
seized the plaintiffs for the purpose of an arrest.164  Where the 
sexual assault occurred “outside of the setting of a custodial arrest 
or investigatory stop,” the incident should be analyzed under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Fourth.165 
Generally, the Fourth Amendment inquiry then becomes 
whether there has been an unreasonable seizure.  This analysis 
involves weighing “the severity of the crime,” “the threat that the 
suspect poses,” and “whether the suspect is resisting or attempting 
flight.”166  Reasonableness, in the context of the Fourth 
Amendment in § 1983 actions, “depends on not only when a seizure 
is made, but also how it is carried out.”167  In determining whether 
a particular arrest is carried out constitutionally, the court weighs 
the nature and quality of the intrusion against the individual 
rights under the Fourth Amendment.168  Likewise, “when there is 
no need for the force, any force is constitutionally unreasonable” 
and “gratuitous and completely unnecessary acts of violence by the 
police during a seizure violate the Fourth Amendment.”169 
These factors of Fourth Amendment analysis all concern 
counter-veiling governmental interests.  Where the seizure 
involves sexual misconduct by an officer, however, the courts in 
Fontana and Knickerbocker note that there is no counter-veiling 
governmental interest170 or  
 
situation that would justify any amount of 
purposeful sexual verbal and physical predation 
against a handcuffed arrestee. No risk of flight nor 
threat to officer safety exists to justify such an abuse 
 
163 Id. at 881.   
164 See Knickerbocker v. City of Colville, No. 2:15-CV-19-RMP, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
107088, at *8-9, 12 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 11, 2016). 
165 Id. at *12-13. 
166 Fontana, 262 F.3d at 880. 
167 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985).   
168 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).   
169 Fontana, 262 F.3d at 880. 
170 Id.; Knickerbocker, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107088, at *9. 
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of the one-sided power arrangement that arises 
from a custodial arrest.171  
 
Unlike cases that involve excessive force by officers, cases 
involving sexual misconduct are easier to prove since it is 
presumed that no sexual touching of a seized person can ever be 
reasonable under any circumstances.  Sexual violence by officers 
when a suspect is arrested, in and of itself, is a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment. 
The Fourteenth Amendment due process clause protects the 
right not to be subjected to the wanton infliction of physical harm 
by anyone acting under color of law, even when not under 
arrest.172  The scope of protection includes the substantive due 
process right to bodily integrity or privacy and the right to be free 
from “sexual fondling and touching or other egregious sexual 
contact.”173  To successfully claim a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment against an officer individually, the misconduct must 
be “so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock 
the contemporary conscious.”174  If sexual misconduct by the 
officer is proven, the conduct shocks the conscience as a matter of 
law.   
In Haberthur v. City of Raymore, Lisa Haberthur claimed a 
violation of her rights under the Fourteenth Amendment against 
the City of Raymore and Officer Steve Untrif.175  Untrif had 
approached Haberthur on multiple occasions leading up to the 
sexual assault and harassment.176  The first occasion, Untrif 
followed Haberthur home and parked in her driveway, when he 
approached her, he told her that he should have ticketed her for 
speeding but did not and left.177  The next interaction occurred 
when Haberthur was at work, Untrif told her that he would be 
waiting for her down the road to give her a ticket.178  The next 
 
171 Fontana, 262 F.3d at 881.   
172 See generally Rogers v. City of Little Rock, 152 F.3d 790, 795-96 (8th Cir. 1998).   
173 Haberthur v. City of Raymore, 119 F.3d 720, 723 (8th Cir. 1997).   
174 Knickerbocker v. City of Colville, No. 2:15-CV-19-RMP, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
107088, at *10.   
175 See Haberthur, 119 F.3d at 721. 
176 Id.  
177 Id.  
178 Id.  
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interaction occurred at Haberthur’s workplace again where, in 
uniform, Untrif “placed his hand under [Haberthur’s] sweatshirt 
and fondled her breast and chest, then ran his hands down her 
sides, placed his arm around her neck, and invited her to go to a 
back room with him.”179  The court held that this was enough to 
sufficiently allege the deprivation of her substantive due process 
rights as there was an implication for sexual contact by a police 
officer who was in uniform, ticketed her, and followed her in his 
police car.180  
A similar situation occurred in Rogers v. City of Little Rock. In 
Rogers, Vivian Rogers was stopped by Officer Vincent Morgan for 
having a broken tail light, then proceeded to ask her for proof of 
insurance for her car and when she did not have it, he called a tow 
truck.181  He then decided to cancel the tow and follow Rogers 
home in his patrol car so that she could look for her insurance 
information.182  While still on duty, Morgan followed Rogers into 
her home where he “started touching and kissing her and led her 
into the bedroom where he told her to take off her clothes.”183  
Rogers began taking off her clothes, but stopped and told Morgan 
that she did not want to have sex with him.184  In response, 
Morgan again demanded that she take off her clothes, pushed her 
onto the bed and had sex with her.185 The court, quoting City of 
Sacramento v. Lewis,186 noted that, “conduct that is ‘intended to 
injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest’ is 
likely to be conscience shocking”187 and the Morgan’s conduct was 
a violation of her constitutional right to “intimate bodily 
 
179 Id. 
180 Id. at 724.   
181 See Rogers v. City of Little Rock, 152 F.3d 790, 793 (8th Cir. 1998). 
182 Id. 
183 Id.  
184 Id.  
185 Id. at 793-794.  
186 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998). In Lewis, a motorcycle 
passenger, Lewis, was killed in a police chase. Id. at 836-37. Lewis’ parents brought a § 
1983 claim alleging that the occurrence was a violation of Lewiw’s Fourteenth Amendment 
right to life. Id. at 837. The Court in Lewis held that a police officer does not violate 
substantive due process by causing death in a reckless and indifferent to life high speed 
chase. Id. at 853-54. 
187 Rogers, 152 F.3d at 797.   
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integrity.”188  Consequently, Morgan was individually liable for 
$100,000 in damages.189 
Section 1983 is an inadequate solution for sexual misconduct 
claims as case law created standards to address excessive force 
cases. Though § 1983, on its face, applies to the broad deprivation 
of rights by officers acting under color of law, case law has shaped 
the applicability of this statute to apply best in cases where law 
enforcement uses excessive force against arrestees.190  Even if 
victims receive monetary damages, the offending officer may still 
remain on the beat unless the department takes disciplinary 
action.191  Thus, analyzing cases of sexual misconduct by law 
enforcement under § 1983 does not make sense and § 1983 has 
failed to be a satisfying legal remedy for victims.192  
 
2. Claims Against the Officer Individually 
 
Elements of a § 1983 action against an officer for engaging in 
sexual misconduct are easy to prove and plaintiffs often win.193  A 
successful § 1983 claim against an officer individually for sexual 
misconduct results in civil damages paid to the victim.194  
Although civil damages under § 1983 may justly compensate a 
victim of excessive force by an officer, it is an incomplete solution 
for a victim of sexual misconduct.  Cities also indemnify officers 
 
188 Id. 
189 Id. at 793. 
190 See Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 876-77 (9th Cir. 2001) 
; McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302, 1305-07 (6th Cir. 1988) (in which the plaintiff was beat 
with a nightstick by a police officer while he was in prison after his arrest); see also 
Knickerbocker v. City of Colville, No. 2:15-CV-19-RMP, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107088 at 
*7-8, 17-18, 25 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 11, 2016). Robins v. Harum, 773 F.2d 1004, 1006, 1008-10 
(9th Cir. 1985) (where plaintiff arrestees were assaulted by the sheriff and the jury returned 
a verdict of excessive use of force and a violation of the Fourth Amendment).   
191 See infra Part II-B (2).  
192 See Fontana, 262 F.3d at 880 (while “excessive force is a useful analog, it is not 
directly applicable to assess [sexual misconduct by police officers] . . .because there can be 
no ‘countervailing governmental interest’” in the context of sexual misconduct.). 
193 See generally Richard Emery & Ilann Margalit Maazel, Why Civil Rights Lawsuits 
Do Not Deter Police Misconduct: The Conundrum of Indemnification and a Proposed 
Solution, 28 FORDHAM URB. L. J., 587, 589 (2000)  (“The great majority of civil rights suits 
actively pursued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 conclude with a settlement for money. When these 
suits proceed to trial, and plaintiffs win, they receive money—often in substantial 
amounts.”). 
194 See id.  
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when they are on the hook individually.195  In fact, officers often 
never pay the damages from their civil cases.196   “[P]olice officers 
are so far removed from the process of settling cases and paying 
money damages that they often have no idea how much their cases 
settle for, or even whether they settle at all.”197  Therefore, results 
of a civil lawsuit do not have a deterrent effect on the officers and 
civil damages alone are insufficient.  As “police departments . . . 
are notoriously unable or unwilling to discipline, much less fire, 
police officers,”198 predacious officers are left on the force leaving 
the public subject to potential future sexual misconduct.   
There is no solution to the deterrence issue in § 1983 actions 
asserted against officers individually.  Indemnification is a result 
of union negotiations with the city, “[w]hen the city errs on the side 
of indemnifying every officer, no one complains.  The unions are 
satisfied—they successfully protect their members.”199  However, 
this is why the proposals suggested to address issues in § 1983 
actions against the municipality are so important.  If officers are 
not deterred from committing sexual misconduct through § 1983 
actions, the department needs to be held responsible for its 
indifference to its officer’s conduct.   
 
C. A § 1983 Action Against the Municipality 
 
A “person” under § 1983 has been extended to cities, 
municipalities, and other local government units for 
“constitutional torts caused by the municipality itself.”200  A § 1983 
claim can be asserted against the department in which the officer 
works when there is a constitutional violation.  In order to 
establish liability of a department or municipal entity under § 
1983, an officer acting in his official capacity must “commit 
unconstitutional acts and those actions are shown to have been 
caused by a ‘policy or custom,’ [of the department].”201 Liability for 
 
195 See id. at 590-91.  
196 See id. at 590. 
197 Id.  
198 Id. at 589.   
199 Id. at 588.   
200 R.A. v. City of New York, 206 F. Supp. 3d 799, 802 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).  
201 Claudio v. City of Chicopee, 965 N.E.2d 209, 212 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012) (quoting 
Estate of Bennett v. Wainwright, 548 F.3d 155, 177 (1st Cir. 2008); see generally 42 U.S.C 
§ 1983 (2012); Rogers v. City of Little Rock, 152 F.3d 790, 799-800 (8th Cir. 1998) 
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officers acting in their official capacities is “another form of action 
against the city, and it requires the same showing that a policy or 
custom caused the alleged violation”202 and a showing of a 
deprivation of rights by an officer acting under color of state 
law.203  Official capacity suits can be brought against the officer 
who commits the sexual misconduct and their superiors, such as 
the police chief.   
To prove a § 1983 claim against the municipality or an officer 
acting within their official capacity, there must be a showing that 
there is a policy or custom within the department that led to the 
constitutional violation.204  An official policy or custom under § 
1983 means:  
 
1.  A policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or 
decision that is officially adopted and promulgated 
by the municipality’s lawmaking officers or by an 
official to whom the lawmakers have delegated 
policy-making authority; or 
2.  A persistent, widespread practice of city officials 
or employees, which, although not authorized by 
officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so 
common and well settled as to constitute a custom 
that fairly represents municipal policy.205 
 
For the department to be liable, their policy or custom must 
amount to tacit authorization or deliberate indifference to the 
constitutional violations committed by the officer.206  In order to 
prove deliberate indifference, there must be “actual or constructive 
notice that its action or failure to act is substantially certain to 
result in a constitutional violation, and it consciously or 
deliberately chooses to disregard the risk of harm.”207  The policy 
 
202 Rogers, 152 F.3d at 800.   
203 See Lemons v. City of Milwaukee, No. 13-C-0331, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88820, at 
*52 (E.D. Wis. July 8, 2016); see also Smith v. Carruth, No. 15-4570, 2017 WL 785345, at 
*2 (E.D. La. Mar. 1, 2017). 
204 See Mason v. Lafayette City-Parish Consol. Gov’t, 806 F.3d 268, 280 (5th Cir. 2015). 
205 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
206 See Rogers, 152 F.3d at 799-800. 
207 Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep’t, 717 F.3d 760, 771 (10th Cir. 2013) 
(quoting Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1307 (10th Cir. 1998) (involving two inmates 
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or custom requirement is used to distinguish the acts of the 
individual officer from the acts of the municipality, thereby 
limiting the liability of the municipality to the acts for which the 
municipality—and not only the individual officer—is also 
responsible.208 
Finally, causation must be established by the plaintiff proving 
that the municipality’s actions or inactions were the moving force 
that caused plaintiff’s deprivation of constitutional rights.209  The 
department’s failures must be the moving force behind the 
violation in that it “requires a forceful showing of both culpability 
and causation” on the part of the department.210  This element is 
applied “with especial rigor” when the claim of municipal liability 
is based on inadequate training, supervision and deficiencies in 
hiring.211   
Inadequate training, supervision and deficiencies in hiring are 
common allegations against the municipality under § 1983.  For a 
successful claim, the plaintiff must prove that the deficient hiring, 
failure to train, or failure to supervise by the department was the 
moving force leading to the constitutional violation by the 
officer.212  These claims are difficult to prove and many cases fail 
on the basis of causation.   
Past lawsuits over sexual misconduct have failed.  For example, 
in Alfaro v. City of Houston, Officer Abraham Joseph “was 
convicted of aggravated sexual assault by a public servant.”213  
Four of his victims sued the City of Houston alleging that they 
were liable under § 1983 “for unconstitutional policies and 
practices in hiring, training, and supervising police officers.”214  
The court determined that the list of approximately twenty 
complaints in a six-year period pertaining to forcible sexual 
assault complaints against numerous officers in the department 
 
who, while serving a 48-hour sentence for minor offenses, were sexually assaulted by a 
jailer and brought § 1983 action)).   
208 See id. at 770.   
209 See id. 
210 Smith v. Carruth, No. CIV.A.15-4570, 2017 WL 785345, at *8-9 (E.D. La. Mar. 1, 
2017) (discussing failure to train liability by the department).  
211 Schneider, 717 F.3d at 770 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
212 See Smith, 2017 WL 785345, at *8-9. 
213 Alfaro v. City of Houston, No. CIV.A.H-11-1541, 2013 WL 3457060, at *1 (S.D. Tex. 
July 9, 2013). 
214 Id.  
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was insufficient.215  The court stated “evidence of prior complaints 
about sexual assaults by officers does not show a pattern that 
would support the inference that the City was deliberately 
indifferent to constitutionally deficient screening of police officers 
or a causal link between the screening and rapes committed by 
police officers.”216  Therefore, the city was not liable.217   
Claims of excessive force by officers and sexual misconduct are 
inherently different.  Force is incidental to arrest, and physical 
force is not illegal for officers to use against those who they suspect 
committed a crime.218  Officers are given wide leeway in 
determining how much force is reasonable under the changing 
circumstances of arrest.  Consequently, courts are hesitant to 
restrict officers’ discretion.219  In the context of sexual misconduct, 
however, any number of sexual misconduct claims asserted 
against any of the officers warrants significant disciplinary action.  
Proving deliberate indifference by the municipality in § 1983 
actions, such as in the Alfaro case and in other cases about sexual 
misconduct allegations, is too demanding of plaintiffs and is based 
on the very different context of excessive force cases. 
Importantly, proving deliberate indifference is a very hard 
burden for plaintiffs to overcome.  Deliberate indifference requires 
“more than a list of instances of misconduct to ensure that the jury 
has the necessary context to glean a pattern”220 and must account 
for the number of incidents in the context of the department’s size 
and number of arrests.221  This high standard makes sense in the 
context of excessive force.  If departments were always liable in 
every excessive force claim by an arrestee who feels that an officer 
could have used less force against him, that would exceed the 
municipality’s rightful liability.  But when there is a list of claims 
of sexual misconduct are made against an officer that 
departments, like Oakland, fail to investigate appropriately, the 
department is acting deliberately indifferent to the misconduct of 
 
215 See id. at *14.  
216 Id. at *13.  
217 Id. at *1.  
218 See generally Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).  
219 Simon Bronitt & Philip Stenning, Understanding Discretion in Modern Policing, 35 
CRIM. L. J. 319, 322 (2011).  
220 Alfaro, 2013 WL 3457060, at *13 (S.D. Tex. July 9, 2013) (citing Peterson v. City of 
Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 851 (5th Cir. 2009)).   
221 Id. (Changed this from the Oporto Cite). 
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their officers.  The high standard is unwarranted and applying it 
leaves sexually predacious officers on the force even when there 
are multiple claims of sexual misconduct asserted against the 




Sexual misconduct by officers involves more than just a few bad 
apples; it is often a systemic problem.222  Accordingly, the issue 
needs to be addressed on two levels, individually and systemically.  
Part III-A addresses the lack of prosecutions under § 242 and 
proposes holding officers accountable by Assistant United States 
Attorneys (“AUSAs”) actively bringing § 242 prosecutions against 
officers.  As explained above, § 1983 actions against the officer 
individually often succeed in achieving verdicts or settlements, but 
they are not successful deterrents of future sexual misconduct due 
to indemnification.223  Accordingly, § 242 will provide the 
deterrent effect necessary to stop officers from engaging in this 
behavior in the first place.   
Part III-B will argue for an additional criminal reform, 
specifically for H.R. Bill 6568, which eliminates the consent 
defense, to be revived and enacted by Congress.  Part III-C and D 
address the systemic nature of the problem.  The civil proposals 
laid out in these parts address § 1983 actions against the 
municipality and the high deliberate indifference standard.  These 
proposals change deliberate indifference in a two-prong approach.  
First, deliberate indifference must be lowered to the standard of 
pattern and practice.  Second, establishing a rebuttable 
evidentiary presumption satisfying the new standard of pattern 
and practice in § 1983 claims of sexual misconduct will hold 
departments liable for their deficient hiring, failure to train, or 
failure to supervise.  Together, these proposals address the 
individual deterrent that is currently lacking while also 
addressing the systemic change that is necessary to change the 




222 See supra Part I-D.  
223 See supra Part II-(B)(1).   
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A. Actively Pursuing § 242 Prosecutions 
 
Section 242 is a law that was enacted to address the issue of sex 
crimes committed by officers.  The legislative history addresses the 
fact that historically, the crimes under the statute were committed 
against freed slaves.224  Over 150 years later, black women are 
still among the targets of sexual misconduct, as exemplified by 
Holtzclaw.225  But sexual misconduct by officers is not only a 
problem experienced by minorities.226  Officers who engage in 
sexual misconduct prey on vulnerable victims who are hesitant to 
report them in the first place.  As the data stands, police officers 
rarely face criminal penalties for this behavior.227  Accordingly, 
AUSAs need to investigate and prosecute officers for committing 
federal crimes.   
Centralizing reports of sexual misconduct to agents of the 
federal government is necessary to address the issues of lack of 
accountability, state prosecutorial bias, and the lack of data on 
sexual misconduct.  Having a particular body that is devoted to 
the investigation of these claims addresses the issue of victims 
having to make a claim to the department in which the officer 
works.  This allows for the victim feeling safe asserting a claim 
and bias free investigation of the claim.  Moreover, this allows for 
the federal government to keep track of sexual misconduct by 
officers, which is something that they do not presently track.228  
Tracking the claims asserted, who the victims are, the context of 
the misconduct, and other variables will allow for the Department 
of Justice to analyze incidents at a foundational level and allow 
them to establish how to best address these claims.   
This proposal is not putting any additional burden on the federal 
government.  It is already the responsibility of AUSAs to prosecute 
 
224 See Watford, supra note 91, at 483.  
225 See generally Larimer, supra note 29; see also KFOR-TV & K. Querry, supra note 
28.  
226 See Mejia, supra note 7.  
227 See Watford, supra note 91, at 483. 
228 E-mail from Deena Smith, Librarian, Fed. Judicial Ctr., to author (Mar. 13, 2018, 
17:48 EST) (on file with author) (stating, “I have not been able to find any research 
conducted by our organization related to police misconduct / police sexual abuse 
(https://www.fjc.gov/research).  I also looked at resources from the Administrative Office of 
the Courts (http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysis-reports), and didn’t find 
anything there either.”). 
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crimes under § 242; they simply are not bringing these cases.  As 
mentioned earlier, this failure may be due to the fact that the 
statute is forgotten or that it is associated with problems of a 
different time.  But the issue of sexual misconduct by officers is 
clearly a very real issue today.  Confusion caused by Screws is 
another reason why this statute may have been shied away from 
by prosecutors.  But unclear case law is no reason to stop bringing 
cases.  Over 70 years has passed since Screws was decided and it 
may be time for a § 242 case to be re-evaluated by the Supreme 
Court to clear up the confusion.  It is up to the prosecutors to bring 
these cases to the Court for this to happen.  In order for there to 
be any future deterring effect on officers engaging in sexual 
misconduct, § 242 needs to be revived to ensure criminal 
accountability of officers.   
 
B. Enact “Closing the Law Enforcement Consent Loophole Act of 
2018” 
 
Presently, H.R. Bill 6568 is dead in Congress.229  For reasons 
discussed throughout this paper, it is imperative that it be revived 
and enacted.  Interestingly enough, a second version of “Closing 
the Law Enforcement Consent Loophole Act of 2018” was 
introduced in November of 2018.230  However, the language in this 
version of the bill, “Closing the Law Enforcement Consent 
Loophole Act of 2018” (hereinafter S. 3688) tracks the language of 
18 U.S.C. § 242.231  An S. 3688 amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 2243 
would add subsection (c), which would prohibit:  
 
 
229 Govtrack H.R. 6568 Overview, supra note 141. 
230 S. 3688 (115th): Closing the Law Enforcement Consent Loophole Act of 2018, Text, 
GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/s3688/text (last visited Oct. 12, 
2019) [hereinafter Govtrack S. 3688]; compare Closing the Law Enforcement Consent 
Loophole Act of 2018, S. 3688, 115th Cong. (2ND SESS. 2018) with 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1996) 
which states:  
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully 
subjects any person . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured 
or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . if such acts include 
kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to commit 
aggravated sexual abuse . . . shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of 
years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death.   
231 See generally S. 3688; 18 U.S.C. § 242 
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Whoever, acting under color of law, knowingly 
engages in a sexual act with an individual, including 
an individual who is under arrest, in detention, or 
otherwise in the actual custody of any Federal law 
enforcement officer, shall be fined under this title, 
imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both.232  
 
It also amends 18 U.S.C. § 2243 to add, “[i]n a prosecution under 
subsection (c), it is not a defense that the other individual 
consented to the sexual act.”233  In essence, S. 3688, seeks to 
criminalize the very acts that § 242 already does.  This just goes 
to show how little-used, § 242 really is and how imperative it is 
that prosecutors actively start bringing charges under this statute.  
Regardless, even though S. 3688 died in Congress,234 H.R. Bill 
6568 should be revived, as it adds meaningful language to federal 
law.  The bill’s goal to close the consent loophole is a critical and 
timely update to federal law.  H.R. Bill 6568 specifically 
criminalizes sexual acts by federal law enforcement officers.  
While states individually are starting to follow New York’s lead in 
enacting similar legislation, having a federal parallel for victims 
of sexual misconduct by federal law enforcement officers is 
essential.  
 
C. Changing Deliberate Indifference to Pattern and Practice 
 
As the law stands, § 1983 claims against the municipality are 
very difficult to prove.   Case law shaped the definition of 
deliberate indifference to address municipal liability for excessive 
force by officers.  A high standard that governs municipal liability 
for legal behavior by officers, however, cannot be the same 
standard that governs municipal liability for illegal sex crimes 
committed by them.  Instead of the high standard of deliberate 
indifference, courts should adopt a lower standard of pattern or 
practice, as defined by the Department of Justice, for claims of 
sexual misconduct.   
 
232 See S. 3688. 
233 Govtrack S. 3688, supra note 230. 
234 S. 3688 (115th): Closing the Law Enforcement Consent Loophole Act of 2018, 
Overview, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/s3688 (last visited Oct. 
12, 2019). 
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The Department of Justice conducts investigations into 
departments through the Civil Rights Section, one of which is a 
pattern and practice investigation.235  Under what was formerly 
42 U.S.C. § 14141, now re-codified as 34 U.S.C. § 12601, it is 
unlawful for a law enforcement agency to “engage in a pattern or 
practice of conduct . . . that deprives persons of rights, privileges, 
or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of 
the United States.”236  In order to conduct a pattern or practice 
investigation, a single incident is not enough; the Department of 
Justice must show “the agency has an unlawful policy or that the 
incidents constituted a pattern of unlawful conduct.”237  In terms 
of sexual misconduct, the pattern and practice would be defined as 
the law enforcement agency engages in a pattern or practice of 
deficient hiring, failure to train, or failure to supervise that leads 
to the constitutional violation the agency will be held liable under 
§ 1983.   
Therefore, the lower standard of pattern and practice still 
embodies the policy considerations under deliberate indifference.  
Some cases will meet the threshold to satisfy the lower standard 
while others will not.   
For example, let’s apply the lower pattern and practice standard 
and evidentiary presumption to the facts of Alfaro v. City of 
Houston.  Four victims of Officer Abraham Joseph sued the City of 
Houston.  Evidence in the case included a list of approximately 
twenty complaints in a six-year period pertaining to forcible sexual 
assault complaints against numerous officers in the department.  
The court said this evidence was insufficient to prove the 
department was deliberately indifferent.238  Under the lower 
standard of pattern and practice, however, the results of the case 
would likely be different.  The four victims of Officer Joseph would 
 
235 How Department of Justice Civil Rights Division Conducts Pattern-or-Practice 
Investigations, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/file/how-pp-investigations-
work/download (last visited Oct. 12, 2019).  
236 34 U.S.C § 12601 (2017).   
237 Addressing Police Misconduct Laws Enforced by the Department of Justice, U.S. 
DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/crt/addressing-police-misconduct-laws-enforced-
department-justice (last updated Feb. 28, 2019).  
238 Alfaro v. City of Houston, No. H-11-1541, 2013 WL 3457060, at *13 (S.D. Tex. July 
9, 2013) (citing Oporto v. City of El Paso, No. EP-10-CV-110-KC, 2010 WL 3503457, at *1 
(W.D. Tex. June 14, 2012) (quoting “where the court rejected 32 similar incidents of police 
misconduct over 15 years.”)). 
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likely satisfy the number of claims required under the 
presumption to be asserted against an individual officer to 
establish pattern or practice.  The burden would now shift to the 
department to rebut the presumption in order to not be held liable.    
Further, the lower standard balances the fact that the 
municipality should only be held liable for their own actions with 
the fact that when there is a pattern of crimes committed by 
officers within a department, the department should be held liable 
for their failure to address it.  Therefore, a single claim against one 
officer in the department, and no other claims made against other 
officers would not lead to municipal liability. 
 
D. Establish a Rebuttable Evidentiary Presumption 
 
In conjunction with lowering the standard to pattern and 
practice, there should be a rebuttable evidentiary presumption of 
pattern or practice when a single officer has three or more claims 
of sexual misconduct against them, or, ten percent of officers in the 
department have claims of sexual misconduct asserted against 
them.  This presumption shifts the burden from the plaintiff to the 
department to prove that there is not a pattern and practice of 
deficient hiring, failure to train, or failure to supervise that led to 
the sexual misconduct at issue.  Further, the presumption 
considers that the current standard of deliberate indifference 
involves “more than a list of instances of misconduct to ensure that 
the jury has the necessary context to glean a pattern”239 and also 
accounts for the number of incidents in the context of the 
department’s size and number of arrests.240  This presumption 
also balances the rights of the department to limit liability to their 
own acts by recognizing that when departments do take the 
necessary corrective action, they will not be held liable for the 
crimes committed by an officer.   
Moreover, this solution also fits the context of proving deliberate 
indifference in sexual misconduct cases as opposed to excessive 
force cases.  A department’s reliance on their officer’s judgment 
about the need for physical force in the moment may be justifiable 
 
239 Alfaro, 2013 WL 3457060 at *13 (citing Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 
851 (5th Cir. 2009).   
240 Oporto, 2010 WL 3503457 at *5. 
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and necessary for policing.  However, an officer choosing to engage 
in sexual misconduct while on duty is never justifiable.  A 
department’s deficient hiring, failure to train, or failure to 
supervise that leads to multiple claims of sexual misconduct 
against an officer or multiple officers in the department should 
result in civil damages.  Having this rebuttable evidentiary 
presumption of deliberate indifference will put departments on 
notice that sexual misconduct claims will not be treated the same 
as excessive force and prudent municipalities will begin to reform 




As the law stands today, victims of sexual misconduct by law 
enforcement officers are left without adequate legal options.  Not 
only are officers not punished criminally, but they are indemnified 
from paying civil damages.  This leaves sexual assaulters and 
rapists patrolling the very communities on which they prey.  
Moreover, under federal law these officers can claim that the 
victim consented to the officer’s abuse of power.  
Sexual misconduct by law enforcement is not the product of a 
few bad apples, it is the product of systemic machismo in 
departments throughout the United States.  While these crimes 
often lurk in the shadows outside of media attention, the horrors 
brought to light by Holtzclaw’s case and the Oakland Police 
Department scandal show how prevalent and widespread this 
problem really is.  The fact that sexual misconduct is “happening 
probably in every law enforcement agency across the country”241 
is unacceptable.  It is time the law reflect how unacceptable this 
behavior is.   
It is the job of prosecutors and civil attorneys alike to seek 
justice for victims of sexual misconduct by law enforcement.  With 
a federal criminal statute already on the books that addresses this 
very issue, it is time prosecutors actively prosecute under it.  Any 
confusion as to the language of the statute is for the courts to 
decide and it is time that they do so.  Additionally, H.R. Bill 6568 
must be enacted so that the law enforcement consent loophole is 
closed.  Civilly, the standards for municipal liability need to be 
 
241 See Betrayed, supra note 43.   
DOCUMENT1 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/2020  5:42 PM 
182 JRNL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT [Vol. 33:2 
lowered.  A two-prong approach, first, changing deliberate 
indifference to pattern and practice, then creating a presumption 
of liability shifting the burden on the department to rebut, creates 
a standard that holds the department liable for deficient hiring, 
failure to train, and failure to supervise officers that commit 
sexual misconduct.   
In our present criminal justice system, sexually based offenses 
are considered especially heinous, except when they are committed 
by law enforcement.  It is time to finally hold the offending officers 
and the departments in which they work accountable for these 
vicious felonies.  
 
